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The digital tachograph system (Generation-1 Digital Tachograph) was originally 
introduced by Council Regulation 3821/85 as amended by Council Regulation 2135/98 
[1] and Commission Regulation 1360/2002 [2].  
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 [3] and its Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2016/799 [4] call for the introduction of a Generation-2 Digital Tachograph system, 
called the Smart Tachograph.  
Annex 1C (Requirements for construction, testing, installation, and inspection) to [4] 
includes the technical specifications of the Smart Tachograph system. Detailed technical 
information is contained in a series of sixteen appendices to Annex 1C. Appendix 11 
(Common Security Mechanisms) describes all details of the cryptographic security 
mechanisms used to protect the data stored and transmitted in the Smart Tachograph 
system.  
The cryptographic keys and certificates used in combination with these security 
mechanisms must be distributed securely between the different parties in the Smart 
Tachograph ecosystem. In particular, some of the keys and of the certificates have to be 
exchanged between an appointed European Authority (the ERCA) and appointed Member 
State Authorities (the MSCAs). The key and certificate distribution mechanisms and 
messages used between the ERCA and the MSCAs are specified in full in the ERCA 
Certificate Policy (CP) [10]. The CP includes a full specification of the format of Certificate 
Signing Requests (CSR) which MSCAs may send to the ERCA in order to obtain a signed 
certificate for a MSCA public key. The ERCA CP also describes the format of Key 
Distribution Requests (KDR) that MSCAs may use to request a symmetric master key 
from the ERCA, and the format of Key Distribution Messages (KDM) that the ERCA will 
use to securely distribute a key to an MSCA in response to a KDR. 
1.1 Scope of this document 
In order to aid manufacturers, component personalisers, certification authorities and 
other Digital Tachograph stakeholders with the development and testing of equipment 
and systems complying with the Generation-2 Smart Tachograph specifications, a 
comprehensive set of Generation-2 sample cryptographic keys and digital certificates has 
been developed; see [9]. 
In order to help MSCAs with the development and testing of their systems for creating 
CSRs and KDRs and processing KDMs, this cryptographic keys and digital certificates 
sample set [9] is complemented with CSRs, KDRs and KDMs samples. These messages 
are created in such a way that the values of the keys and certificates embedded in them 
are fully consistent with the ERCA and MSCAs cryptographic keys and digital certificates 
in the sample set. Basically the CSRs, KDRs and KDMs samples represent the distribution 
messages for the ERCA and MSCAs keys and certificates that are in the sample set.   
The current document serves to detail the contents of the CSRs, KDRs and KDMs 
samples. It must be read in conjunction with the description of the cryptographic keys 
and digital certificates sample set, see [9]. 
1.2 Intended audience 
This document is intended for MSCA employees and contractors involved in the 
development of MSCA systems that will generate or process the certificate signing 
requests, key distribution requests and key distribution messages which the MSCA will 
use to communicate with the ERCA.  
Readers of this document should be familiar with Appendix 11 to Annex 1C [4] and with 




Readers of this document should also be familiar with the contents of the cryptographic 
keys and digital certificates sample set [9]. 
1.3 Disclaimer 
The CSRs, KDRs and KDMs samples have to be seen only as a support to the 
development and testing processes of the MSCAs. In the event of any conflict between 
the contents of the samples and the ERCA Certificate Policy, the latter shall prevail. Each 
MSCA remains fully responsible for making sure that their systems comply with all 
requirements in the ERCA Certificate Policy [10] and the Commission Implementing 




2 CSR, KDR and KDM formats 
For an overview of the Smart Tachograph system and it security mechanisms, please 
refer to Chapter 2 of [9]. For an explanation of the mechanisms used for distributing 
keys and certificates between the ERCA and the MSCAs, please refer to chapter 4 of [10]. 
For the convenience of the reader, this section summarizes the formats of the CSRs, 
KDRs and KDMs specified in [10]. 
2.1 Certificate Signing Request format 
The format of the Certificate Signing Requests sent by the MSCAs to the ERCA in order to 
obtain a signed MSCA certificate for an MSCA public key is show in the table below: 
Data Object Presence Tag 
Authentication c ‘67’ 
 ECC (CV) Certificate m ‘7F 21’ 
  Certificate Body m ‘7F 4E’ 
   Certificate Profile Identifier m ‘5F 29’ 
   Certification Authority Reference m ‘42’ 
   Certificate Holder Authorisation m ‘5F 4C’ 
   Public Key m ‘7F 49’ 
    Standardised Domain Parameters OID m ‘06’ 
    Public Point m ‘86’ 
   Certificate Holder Reference m ‘5F 20’ 
   Certificate Effective Date m ‘5F 25’ 
   Certificate Expiry Date m ‘5F 24’ 
  Inner Signature m ‘5F 37’ 
 Certification Authority Reference of Outer Signature Signatory c ‘42’ 
  Outer Signature c ‘5F 37’ 
Table 1 Certificate Signing Request format 
As specified in section 4.1.1 of the ERCA Certificate Policy, the Inner Signature is self-
signed, i.e., it is created using the private key belonging to the public key in the 
certificate body. 
Table 1 shows that the presence of the Authentication tag and length, the Certification 
Authority Reference of Outer Signature Signatory object and the Outer Signature object is 
conditional. In fact, these fields are only present in case the CSR is not the first CSR 
originating from a certain MSCA. For all subsequent CSRs, the Outer Signature is created 
by one of the currently valid MSCA certificates of the same type. For all details of CSR 




2.2 Key Distribution Request format 
The format of the Key Distribution Requests sent by the MSCAs to the ERCA in order to 
obtain a symmetric master key is show in the table below: 
Data object Presence Tag 
Key Distribution Request  m ‘A1’ 
 Request Profile Identifier m ‘5F 29’ 
 Message Recipient Authorisation m ‘83’ 
 Key Identifier m ‘84’ 
 Public Key (for ECDH key agreement) m ‘7F 49’ 
   Standardised Domain Parameters OID m ‘06’ 
   Public Point m ‘86’ 
 
Table 2 Key Distribution Request format 
The Message Recipient Authorisation encodes the type and version of the requested 
symmetric key. 
 
When an MSCA creates a KDR, it must generate an ephemeral ECDH key pair for key 
agreement. The public key of this key pair is put it the KDR as shown in Table 2; the 
private key is kept in the HSM of the MSCA. See next section for a summary of the key 
agreement process. 
 
The Key Identifier in the KDR is a unique 8-byte octet string identifying the MSCA 
ephemeral public key for key agreement.  
 
For all details of KDR contents and formatting, please refer to section 4.2.1 of the ERCA 




2.3 Key Distribution Message format 
The format of a Key Distribution Message sent by the ERCA to an MSCA in response to a 
Key Distribution Request is show in the table below: 
Data object Presence Tag 
Key Distribution Message m ‘A1’ 
 Request Profile Identifier m ‘5F 29’ 
 Message Recipient Authorisation m ‘83’ 
 Key Identifier of the MSCA ephemeral key pair  
 for ECDH key agreement 
m ‘84’ 
 Public Point of the ERCA for ECDH key agreement m ‘86’ 
 Encrypted symmetric key m ‘87’ 
 MAC  m ‘88’ 
 
Table 3 Key Distribution Message format 
The Message Recipient Authorisation encodes the type and version of the distributed 
symmetric key. It is copied from the related KDR; see previous section. 
 
The Key Identifier in the KDM is copied by the ERCA from the related Key Distribution 
Request, see previous section. When the MSCA receives the KDM, it uses the Key 
Identifier to identify the private key that it must use to perform key agreement. 
 
When the ERCA creates a Key Distribution Message, it generates an ephemeral ECDH key 
pair for key agreement, using the standardized domain parameters indicated in the KDR 
from the MSCA. It includes the Public Point in the KDM; see Table 3. Next, it performs 
ECDH key agreement using its ephemeral private key and the ephemeral public key in 
the KDR. Key agreement results in two AES keys: one key KENC for encryption and one 
key KMAC for authentication.  
 
The ERCA uses KENC to encrypt the requested symmetric key. It then puts the encrypted 
symmetric key in the KDM as shown in Table 3. Next, the ERCA uses KMAC to calculate a 
MAC over the encrypted key, the Message Recipient Authorisation and the Key Identifier. 
The MAC is put in the KDM. 
 
When the Key Distribution Message arrives at the MSCA, the MSCA uses the Key 
Identifier to identify the private key in its HSM that it must use for key agreement. The 
MSCA uses this private key, together with the ERCA public point in the KDM, to arrive at 
the same AES keys that the ERCA derived. The MSCA uses these keys to verify the MAC 
in the KDM and decrypt the encrypted symmetric key. 
 
For all details of KDM contents and formatting, please refer to section 4.2.4 of the ERCA 





3 Contents and values of CSR, KDR and KDM samples 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the CSR, KDR and KDM sample messages. It describes the folder 
structure containing these sample messages, the logic behind the presence of these 
messages, and the contents of these messages. 
At the top level of the sample set two folders are present, called ‘CSRs’ and ‘KDRs and 
KDMs’. These folders are in correspondence to the two top folders of the set of 
cryptographic keys and digital certificates samples [9], namely ‘ECC keys and certificates’ 
and ‘AES keys’. 
Section 3.2 describes the CSRs present in the sample set.  
Section 3.3 describes the KDRs and KDMs.  
3.2 Certificate Signing Requests 
3.2.1 CSRs present 
The logic behind the presence of the CSRs is as follows: for every MSCA certificate 
present in the folder ‘ECC keys and certificates’ of the set of cryptographic keys and 
digital certificates samples, there is a corresponding CSR in the folder ‘CSRs’. Please note 
that no CSRs are present for the ERCA certificates, since such certificates will not be 
requested by means of a CSR. Neither are any CSRs present for the equipment 
certificates, since the format of the CSRs used to request such certificates is MSCA-
specific and out of scope for this document. 
3.2.2 CSR file naming 
The name of each CSR in the sample set is consistent with the name of the 
corresponding certificate; please refer to [9] for more information on the naming system 
for the certificates.  
For example, the MSCA for Arcadia may have used ARC_MSCA_Card (1-1)_CSR to 
request the ERCA to sign certificate ARC_MSCA_Card (1-1). This means that the 
Certificate Body object in the CSR (see section 2.1) is identical to the Certificate Body in 
the corresponding certificate. 
3.2.3 Data element values for CSRs 
Apart from the Certification Authority Reference of Outer Signature Signatory field, the Outer 
Signature and the Inner Signature, the value of all data elements in a CSR in the sample 
is equal to the corresponding data element value in the corresponding certificate. Please 
refer to chapter 4 in [9]. 
Regarding the Certification Authority Reference of Outer Signature Signatory field: the value of 
this field in a CSR is equal to the value of the Certificate Holder Reference field in the 
certificate that must be used to verify the outer signature, if present. The outer signature 
is created by the previous MSCA private key of the same type (MSCA_VU-EGF or 
MSCA_Card). For example: 
• The outer signature of ARC_MSCA_Card (1-2)_CSR can be verified using the 
public key in certificate ARC_MSCA_Card (1-1). 
• The outer signature of ARC_MSCA_Card (2-1)_CSR can be verified using the 
public key in certificate ARC_MSCA_Card (1-2). 
• The outer signature of UTO_MSCA_VU-EGF (3-1)_CSR can be verified using the 




Note that the outer signature (including the Certification Authority Reference of Outer 
Signature Signatory field and the Authentication tag and length) is absent for all CSRs 
whose name ends with …(1-1)_CSR, because these certificates are the first ones for the 
particular MSCA (UTO or ARC) and MSCA type (MSCA_VU-EGF or MSCA_Card).   
3.3 Key Distribution Requests and Messages 
3.3.1 KDRs and KDMs present 
The logic behind the presence of the KDRs and KDMs in the sample set is summarized 
here. According to section 4.2.1 of the ERCA Certificate Policy, there are four master 
keys that must be distributed from the ERCA to the MSCAs, namely  
• the motion sensor master key (MSMK),  
• the motion sensor master key - workshop part (MSMK-WC),  
• the motion sensor master key - VU part (MSMK-VU),  
• the DSRC master key (DSRCMK). 
These keys are present in the folder ‘AES keys’ of the set of cryptographic keys and 
digital certificates samples. Each of them has to be distributed to the MSCAs of Arcadia 
and Utopia. The KDRs, KDMs and associated data corresponding to these distributions 
are in the folder ‘KDRs and KDMs’. 
Note that no KDR – KDM pairs are present for the VU-specific DSRC keys in the sample 
set. Neither are there KDR – KDM pairs for the distribution of the encrypted motion 
sensor serial number and Pairing Key. This is because the format of these KDRs and 
KDMs is MSCA-specific and out of scope for this document. 
3.3.2 KDR and KDM file naming and folder contents 
In the folder ‘KDRs and KDMs’, a separate folder is present for each master key to be 
distributed to Arcadia and Utopia, with the name of the folder reflecting the name of the 
master key. In each folder the KDR, its associated KDM and also additional key material 
is present. For example, the folder for the distribution of the DSRCMK-1 master key to 








The contents of these files are described below: 
• DSRCMK-1_UTO_KDR.bin contains the key distribution request sent by the UTO 
MSCA to the ERCA to receive the DSRCMK-1 key. 





• DSRCMK-1_UTO_msca_ephemeral_private_key.pkcs8 contains the plain-text 
value of the ephemeral ECDH private key for key agreement generated by the 
UTO MSCA in the course of creating the KDR – see section 4.2.3 of the ERCA CP, 
ref. [10]. The structure of this file complies with Appendix 1 in this document. 
• DSRCMK-1_UTO_erca_ephemeral_private_key.pkcs8 contains the plain-text value 
of the ephemeral ECDH private key for key agreement generated by the ERCA in 
the course of creating the KDM. 
• DSRCMK-1_UTO_Kenc.bin and DSRCMK-1_UTO_Kmac.bin contain the plain-text 
values of KENC and KMAC, respectively. These keys are used to protect the 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the distributed key. As described in 
section 4.2.3 of the ERCA CP, these keys are derived from the value of the 
ephemeral key pairs of the ERCA and of the MSCA used in the KDR-KDM 
exchange.   
Similarly for other master keys: the associated folder will contain the same files but with 
the first part of all file names changed accordingly 
3.3.3 Data element values for KDRs in the sample set  
Field Value 
Request Profile Identifier ‘00’ 
Message Recipient Authorisation  
• The six most significant 
bytes of the Tachograph 
Application ID 
‘FF 53 4D 52 44 54’ 
• Key type ‘07’ for motion sensor master key (file name 
contains “MSMK-x”) 
‘27’ for motion sensor master key workshop 
part (file name contains “MSMK-WC-x”) 
‘67’ for motion sensor master key VU part 
(file name contains “MSMK-VU-x”) 
‘09’ for DSRC master key (file name contains 
“DSRCMK-x”) 
• version number of the 
requested master key 
‘01’, ‘02’ or ‘03’, as indicated in file name 
Key Identifier   
• NationNumeric For country UTO: ‘FB  
For country ARC: ‘FC’  
• NationAlpha “UTO” for Utopia 
“ARC” for Arcadia 
• keySerialNumber  Per MSCA, use 1 for the first KDR (= first 




• additionalInfo ‘4B 52’ (“KR”) 
• CA identifier ‘01’ 
Public Key (for ECDH key 
agreement) 
 
• Standardised Domain 
Parameters OID 
For country UTO: OID of the Brainpool curve 
with the correct key length, see Appendix 11 
For country ARC: OID of the NIST curve with 
the correct key length, see Appendix 11 
• Public Point Random value of the correct length 
 
3.3.4 Data element values for KDMs in the sample set  
Field Value 
Request Profile Identifier ‘00’ 
Message Recipient Authorisation Equal to the Message Recipient Authorisation 
field in the corresponding KDR, see previous 
section 
Key Identifier of the MSCA 
ephemeral key pair for ECDH key 
agreement 
Equal to the Key Identifier field in the 
corresponding KDR, see previous section  
Public Point of the ERCA for ECDH 
key agreement 
Random value of length equal to the length 
of the Public Point in the corresponding KDR, 
see previous section 
Encrypted symmetric key The symmetric key requested in the 
corresponding KDR, encrypted with KENC as 
specified in the ERCA Certificate Policy 
MAC  The MAC, calculated using KMAC as specified 





4 Testing possibilities with the CSRs and KDRs 
The CSRs and KDRs allow extensive testing of the mechanisms specified in chapter 4 of 
the ERCA Certificate Policy: 
• An MSCA can verify that its system is capable of generating the correct CSR for all 
MSCA certificates in the sample set, including the outer signature (if present). The 
CSRs generated by its system should be fully equal to the CSRs in the sample set. 
• An MSCA can verify that its system is capable of generating the correct KDR for all 
symmetric master keys in the sample set. The KDRs generated by its system 
should be fully equal to the KDRs in the sample set, provided they use the MSCA 
ephemeral key pair provided in the folder of each KDR / KDM (see section 3.3.2). 
• An MSCA can verify that its system is capable of successfully processing the KDMs 
in the sample set. Processing a KDM should lead to the import of the relevant 
master key in (the HSM connected to) its system. Successful processing of a KDM 
is dependent on the use of the private MSCA ephemeral key provided in the folder 
of each KDR / KDM  (see section 3.3.2). 
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
AES   Advanced Encryption Standard 
CSR   Certificate Signing Request 
ECC   Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDH   Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (key agreement protocol) 
EGF   External GNSS Facility 
ERCA   European Root Certificate Authority 
GNSS   Global Navigation Satellite System 
KDM   Key Distribution Message 
KDR   Key Distribution Request 
MA   Mutual Authentication 
MS   Motion Sensor 
MSCA   Member State Certificate Authority 
PKI   Public Key Infrastructure 
SHA-2   Secure Hash Algorithm 2 
TC   Tachograph Card 




Appendix 1 Format of .pkcs8 files 
Format of .pkcs8 files in the sample set, according to RFC 5958 [5]. All values hexadecimal. 
30 L SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF OneAsymmetricKey; see RFC 5958 [5]. Both of the optional elements 
attributes and publicKey in this data type are omitted 
  02 01 00 Version; the value is set to ‘00’ to indicate that the format of OneAssymmetricKey is equal to that of 
PrivateKeyInfo as specified in RFC 5280 
  30 L PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier 
    06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 
02 01 
PUBLIC-KEY: Algorithm identifier for elliptic curve is given in RFC 5912 [6] 
    06 L V PrivateKeyAlgorithms: see data type ECParameters in RFC 5912 [6]. The CHOICE made here is to use a 
namedCurve; the value is the DER-encoded OID of the relevant curve. 
  04 L OCTET STRING containing private key; see RFC 5958 [5]  
    30 L ECPrivateKey; see RFC 5915 [7]. Both of the optional elements parameters and publicKey in 
this data type are present. 
      02 01 01 version; the value represents ecPrivkeyVer1. 
      04 L V OCTET STRING containing the value of the private key 
      A0 L  parameters 
        06 L V ECParameters; the CHOICE made here is to use a namedCurve; the value is 
the DER-encoded OID of the relevant curve. 
      A1 L publicKey 
        03 L V BITSTRING containing the value of the public key. Note that the first byte 
‘00’ indicates zero empty bits, as per the definition of the ASN.1 BITSTRING 
data type. The second byte ‘04’ indicates the uncompressed encoding, as 
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